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On August Business Roundtable (2019), the Business Roundtable redefined the
purpose and social responsibility of the corporation. Yet, this statement must be followed
by substantial changes in the business models of corporations for it to avoid becoming
empty rhetoric. We believe that the figure of the independent director may be one of the
catalysts needed for this change of paradigm for corporations. In spite of the positive
correlation between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and board independence,
the development of the independence of boards during the last decade has not lead
to the expected CSR results. Academics and regulators point to a weak definition and
the non-standardized measurement of both independence and board independence
(BI) as one possible explanation, and agree that a broader definition is needed. This
paper aims to contribute to this debate. We develop a second-generation definition
of independence based on a positive approximation to the concept by integrating an
Aristotelian perspective of virtue ethics with the best practices of corporate governance.
Thus, we define independence as a virtue guided by practical wisdom, that implies
autonomy and autarky and which enables a person to act with integrity, fairness and
truthfulness. In the context of corporate governance, independence is associated with
an honest disposition to serve. Our proposal has political implications for supervisors
that make decisions relating to the suitability of board members.
Keywords: board independence, independent director, CSR, corporate governance, virtue ethics, practical
wisdom, integrity
INTRODUCTION
On August 19, Business Roundtable (2019), 181 top CEOs from the Business Roundtable (BRT)
signed a statement that redefined the main purpose and social responsibility of the corporation.
While a previous declaration in Business Roundtable (1997) fostered shareholder primacy,
defending Friedman (1970)’s view that the only responsibility of business is to increase profits,
the new guidelines seek to benefit all stakeholders, taking into consideration customers, employees,
suppliers, community members and shareholders. Such corporate purpose is broader and more
complete, closer to creating long-term value and shared prosperity in a sustainable way. This
change of paradigm can be understood as a response to rising challenges to the social legitimacy
of corporations in the wake of widespread inequality and environmental degradation.
Although the BRT statement is a promising start, it needs to be followed by substantial changes
in the business model of many of the companies of the signatories. Otherwise the statement is just
empty rhetoric (Bebchuk and Tallarita, 2020). Corporate governance cannot be alien to change and
it must embrace instruments that make it more sensitive to its social and environmental impact.
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Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives are strategic
by nature. As such, they fall under the mandate of the board of
directors in a critical way (Gordon, 2007; Fassin and Gosselin,
2011). Indeed, theoretical and empirical literature have shown
a positive correlation between CSR initiatives and the increased
role played by independent directors (Chang et al., 2012). In
a survey of 307 board members, Ibrahim et al. (2003) found
that independent directors exhibit greater concern about the
discretionary component of CSR. Webb’s (2004) analysis suggests
that CSR is associated with independent and women directors.
In other empirical study, Harjoto and Jo (2011) also discovered
the CSR choice is positively correlated with Board Independence
(hereafter BI), one of the essential characteristics of an effective
board. Htay et al. (2012) found a similar correlation, this time
with environmental aspects of CSR.
Independent directors are neither executive nor proprietary.
Initially, within the framework that the purpose of the
corporation was to create value for the shareholders, independent
directors were meant to represent all those shareholders not
represented on the board. However, in the context in which
the company acquires more responsibilities, beside profits,
expanding the field of action to all stakeholders on whom it
has an impact, independent directors are entrusted with the
responsibility to serve those stakeholders not represented in the
board, taking into account their interests, needs and aspirations.
Thus, when directors perform their duty well, the composition
of the board of directors should improve CSR practices. This is
attested by different studies (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Cai et al.,
2006; Rouf, 2011) that, however, indicate that the progression is
not as expected (Cf. Cuadrado et al., 2015).
Since the financial crisis in 2008, and thanks to general
regulatory requirements and shareholder pressure, BI has become
one of the most recommended practices in financial corporations
(Pathan, 2009; Mehran et al., 2011; Sharpe, 2011; Adams and
Mehran, 2012). Considered as an antidote to new corporate
crises, independent members of the board have increased
exponentially in financial corporations, reaching up to 70–85%
in the United States (Adams, 2012) with similar figures in
non-United States and some OECD countries (De Andres and
Vallelado, 2008). In the context of the United States, Gordon
(2007) shows that the presence of independent board members
has augmented from 20% (in the 1950s) to 75% (in the 2000s).
The increase is also exponential in non-financial large public
corporations (Htay et al., 2012; Walls and Hoffman, 2012).
Given the positive correlation between BI and CSR, the growth
of BI should be good news for social responsibility as it may
be one of instruments with which to foster the balancing of
stakeholder interests in current business models, as demanded
by the BRT statement. However, the expected CSR results have
not been produced. In the search for answers, (Bartukus et al.,
2002; Cho and Kim, 2007; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011; Chang
et al., 2012), academics and regulators have pointed to a weak
definition and measurement of both BI and independence as
one possible explanation, and agree that a broader definition is
needed (Joseph et al., 2014) especially if the social purpose in
organizations needs to advance by integrating profits with other
business purposes.
When it comes to BI, the literature focuses on its
current definitional shortcomings. To start with, purely
quantitative descriptions for it (understood as the ratio of
outside/independent directors to inside directors) are criticized
as inadequate. Adams (2012) emphasizes that this ratio alone
is not a sufficient metric of “good governance”, and Rao and
Tilt (2015) highlight the importance of using more qualitative
methods. Similarly, Roberts et al. (2005) argue that having high
numbers of independent members alone is of little use, as they
must be active in order to be effective. Following these arguments,
John et al. (2016) emphasize the importance of the “quality”
of these independent directors, and recommend developing
new and effective measures for it. Mehran et al. (2011), in turn,
discuss whether board members can indeed exercise intellectual
independence in the performance of their duties.
As for independence itself, the search for a global and
consistent definition has been eluded both by regulators and
academics (Hooghiemstra and van Manen, 2004). We have
identified two main approaches currently used to consider
someone to be independent: one based on the status and the
other based on the context. The status-based approach – used
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) or Nasdaq–, describes an
ex ante materiality; the contextual approach – followed among
others by the European Central Bank (ECB) (Rodrigues, 2008;
Sharpe, 2011) – distinguishes between formal independence
and Independence of Mind (IoM). Although with a different
focus, both approaches depend solely on negative and passive
descriptions to define the independence of members, whether as
“outsider,” “non-executive,” “non-employee,” “non-interested,” or
“disinterested.”
We believe these first-generation definitions are incomplete
and they fall far short of enabling the change in corporate
governance decisions that the BRT requires. A more complete
definition should aim for an integral approach of the individual,
thus taking into account the past, the context, and the objective
and subjective qualification of the person (Kaptein and Wempe,
2002; Calderón et al., 2018), and make independent directors
truly empowered to make decisions with a strong ethical, as well
as economic, consequences.
Evidence has proved that whenever executives failed, it was
rarely because of a lack of expertise or technical training, but
due to interpersonal skills and practical wisdom (Bennis and
O’Toole, 2005). In this line, we propose a second-generation
definition of independence that hinges on its positive and active
role, integrating an Aristotelian perspective of virtue ethics
with the best practices of corporate governance. We define
independence as a virtue guided by practical wisdom, that
implies autonomy and autarky and which enables a person to
act with integrity, fairness and truthfulness. In the context of
corporate governance, independence is associated with an honest
disposition to serve.
Practical wisdom (phronesis) is the habitual disposition of
doing the right things the right way (Shotter and Tsoukas, 2014).
Judgment is the inherent action of independent directors and
phronesis the virtue of “good judgment” (Solomon, 1992: 328–
29). Practical wisdom develops the moral character, the priority
lies with whom directors become as a result of their actions.
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Independence implies a way of being that is intimately related
to the concepts of autarky and autonomy. This is an acquired,
conquered and configured capacity aided by both wisdom and
will, which translates into three fundamental characteristics
that are exhibited by the person that seeks to be independent:
integrity (Tanner et al., 2019), fairness (Diao et al., 2019;
Trinh, 2019) and truthfulness (Zagzebski, 1996). In addition,
the independent person that occupies an executive responsibility
also exhibits an honest disposition to serve (Heintz et al., 2016),
since governance is synonymous with service and thus requires
continuous learning, training, updating and commitment. Our
contribution becomes especially important to guide supervisors –
such as the ECB – that make decisions relating to the suitability
of board members, with independence being one of its key
elements. Yet, it is not our intention to provide a step-by-step
guide to evaluate the degree of independence of a candidate but
to set the general guidelines that should inspire normative efforts
to achieve this.
This paper proceeds as follow. Section “The Current
Situation of Independence: The First Generation” offers a critical
description of the first generation of independence and its
two main approaches. Section “The Second Generation: A
Positive Approach to Independence” analyses the key dimensions
of independence and it proposes a positive definition of
the concept, referred to here as the second generation of
independence. Section “Conclusion” summarizes the main
conclusions of the paper.
THE CURRENT SITUATION OF
INDEPENDENCE: THE FIRST
GENERATION
BI has exponentially increased in financial and large public
corporations, without a debate about its defining conditions.
As Fairfax (2010:133) details “the term independent director has
no uniform definition; instead judges and legislators define the
term differently. Moreover, the term is used differently in various
contexts.”
Belonging to a board of directors, whatever the category of
the director, implies that person is bound to a duty of care and
a duty of loyalty, the purpose of which is to align the interests
of the administrators and the shareholders with those of the
stakeholders, with the objective of creating value and ensuring
its distribution, as well as giving confidence to the market. To
carry out these duties, the members of the board, whatever their
category, must perform their functions and hold their opinions
independently, that is, without being conditioned by the interests
of others and with the strength or soundness of character that
their position requires.
However, in corporate governance when we talk about
an independent director, we do not refer to that generic
independence but to a more specific and regulatory one.
Accordingly, two different approaches have been adopted to
describe an independent member: the status-based approach
and the contextual approach which together formed the first
generation of independence.
The Status-Based Approach to
Independence
In response to the Enron and subsequent debacles, and to the
recurrent implication of executive directors in the scandals,
regulation adopted an incisive spirit of “command-and-control”
with the aim of mitigating agency costs and restoring lost
integrity (Thibodeau and Freier, 2014). In this context, it
was understood that the most outstanding characteristic of an
independent member to inspire confidence as a controller was
precisely to be able to ensure that she had no relationships
or potential conflicts of interest with the firms she was trying
to supervise. In this line, SOX, which was one of the major
regulatory responses in this spirit, described the independent
director through the status approach.
Most regulators from the Anglo-Saxon tradition follow the
line marked by SOX, such as NASDAQ or the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), and understand that the distinguishing
characteristic of the independent director is the status of outsider,
analyzed from the point of view of her past relationships with the
company. Thus, the status-based approach defines independence
as a sign of non-dependence referring to the independent
director as an “outsider,” “non-executive,” “non-employee,” or
“disinterested” board member. The non-dependence status,
which can be certified ex ante by looking into the past and with
no reference to the context of the transaction, reflects the absence
of both financial links with the corporation and family ties with
management, and it must be ratified by the board.
The NYSE and NASDAQ stipulate that an independent
member cannot have any “material relationship” with the listed
company [NYSE, §303A (2) (a)], meaning not only that she
should not be directly related as a partner, shareholder or officer,
but also that she should pass an exhaustive test of materiality.
The definition of materiality, assessed at the time of entry of
the new member to the board, requires verifying (a) the present
and (b) past relationships of the individual, and (c) of her
family members or their associates to the corporation. Regarding
past relationships, materiality is described both by the type of
relationship itself, by the intensity or by the years elapsed since
those relationships ceased to the present. Each regulator develops
its own materiality test along these lines.
For instance, the NASDAQ materiality test considers that any
trace of previous service to the corporation will be eliminated
after 3 years instead of five; it uses a broader definition of
family member, which includes any person who is related by
blood, marriage or adoption or who has the same residence; it
recognizes dependency in any person who has received more than
$60,000 from the company for consulting or other services in the
previous 3 years, or when the director had been a partner, officer
or majority shareholder of a company that made or received
payments above a certain amount in the previous 3 years.
This view of non-dependence is directly correlated with
the agency problem, perhaps the central problem of corporate
governance in banks (Rodrigues, 2008), which has been found at
the core of many scandals (Bainbridge, 2002).
Large public corporations and banks are characterized by
fragmented and dispersed ownership and the lack of power,
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incentive or means to monitor the actions and decisions
of the managers (Mehran et al., 2011). In this context,
managers may act in their own best interest rather than in the
interest of the firm (Gilson and Schwartz, 2015). Independent
members should contribute (a) to align the financial interests of
executives with those of shareholders, decreasing agency costs
and “opportunistic” behavior and (b) to preserve the long-term
interest of the company when conflict between majority and
minority shareholders arises, curbing the extraction of private
benefits to the detriment of other stakeholders, and (c) to align
social responsibility (Courteau et al., 2017).
Independent members should help shareholders to solve this
agency problem because they have no “need or inclination to
stay in the good graces of management and (. . .) will be able
to speak out, inside and outside the boardroom, in the face of
management’s misdeeds in order to protect the interests of the
shareholders” (Clarke, 2007: 84). As Dallas (2003) emphasizes,
while insider-dominated boards perform the role of formulating
corporate strategy more effectively, an outsider-dominated board
is preferred to perform the function of management monitoring
more effectively.
Judged from a historical perspective, the status-based
approach contributed considerably to the good corporate
governance of the entities enhancing their materiality tests in
order to overcome the ambiguous nature of these subjects.
However, this approach has been criticized accordingly for
its negative perspective and especially for its static and
a priori assessment.
Indeed, in the context of the resolution of agency problems,
independence, that is non-dependence, is understood as distance
and even as preventive mistrust. However, necessarily over
time, an independent director will acquire familiarity with the
company and its executives, which would prevent her from being
qualified literally as an outsider, or as a disinterested member.
This familiarity, increasing over time, nevertheless has a positive
interpretation, since with a closer knowledge of the company
and its management, a constructive director may contribute
to a greater degree and with higher quality in the decision-
making process. In sum, the fact that a person fulfils some
criteria ex ante does not guarantee an ex post independent
behavior. As Sharpe (2011) highlights, the independence that is
only verified ex ante cannot be more than cosmetic. As Roberts
et al. (2005, pp. 16–17) point out, under certain circumstances,
independence will not be “an independence from executives, but
rather exercising an IoM in support of executive and company
success. In bad times, non-executives can support executives
with suggestions and advice about how to weather a storm.
In good times, they can act as a guardian against executive
exuberance.”
Furthermore, taking into consideration the increasing
complexity of the corporate activity and its opacity, a complete
lack of familiarity with the subject would be counterproductive
but a strong familiarity with it would result in the rejection of
many candidates (Adams, 2012).
On the other hand, we can argue that non-dependence
does not guarantee a correct decision if it is not accompanied
by other factors. In other words, being non-dependent is
not always or even in any case, synonymous with being
independent (Fairfax, 2010). In that vein, Sharpe (2011)
distinguishes between a cosmetic independence that takes into
account only a corporate relationship with the corporation
and not the tools a director needs to achieve substantive
independence, and a high-performance independence, which
includes the critical components of good decision-making: time,
information and knowledge.
The argument that materiality must be completed with
other elements has opened the door to a more contextual
view of independence. We agree that the status-based approach
falls short since it does not guarantee that an independent
director would act with the required independence of character.
However, we believe that the materiality of independence, defined
unambiguously in negative terms, becomes a prudent safeguard
of the preliminary conditions. That is, materiality is a necessary
condition, but it is not enough and, therefore, it is partial and
incomplete (Bainbridge, 2002). In the negative terms and as
a starting condition, independence points to someone who is
shown as independent, who seems to be independent because
certain circumstances occur around her, but albeit necessary, this
approximation falls short.
The Contextual Approach to
Independence
Considering an ex ante definition of independence as essentially
impossible, the contextual approach proposes the analysis of
each conflict of interest, observing a combination of factors as
an alternative to the rigid and pre-programmed status view.
Hence, it distinguishes between an independent and an interested
member. A director is interested in a given transaction if
she stands to gain monetarily from it in a way that other
shareholders do not or if she expects to derive any personal
financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing (Clarke,
2007). The focus is not reduced to the area of financial interest.
It must be examined whether a director is in some way
committed to, or exhibits affinity toward another individual
who is interested, or whether she is influenced by personal
considerations. Therefore, circumstances such as belonging to the
same university, being involved in the same charitable donations,
sharing a common religion or friendships may be factors to be
taken into consideration.
The approach endeavors to ensure the “no interest” of the
director, but not her disinterest. If independent directors must
address complex instruments and trading activities (Andrés et al.,
2012) they must be professionals in an area which is akin to the
financial sector, therefore a rigid catalog of ex ante materiality
cannot contemplate all the situations that are likely to take place
ex post (Langevoort, 2001).
It is this line of thought which underpins the doctrine of
supervisors such as the ECB, responsible for the prudential
supervision of credit institutions located in the euro area
and participating non-euro area member states. The ECB
articulates the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) with
internal governance being one of the top supervisory priorities.
The ECB must adopt decisions relating to the suitability of board
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members, and independence is one of the elements which it
has to watch over.
Starting with a regulatory position in line with the status-
based approach, in recent years, the ECB evolved its stance
developing a new approximation around the concept of IoM. It
tries to overcome the problems generated by the approach to
independence based exclusively on the status of the director.
The (European Central Bank [ECB] (2016): 8) first
introduced this contextual approach of independence in its
publications in 2016 highlighting that “from a theoretical point
of view, independence should be understood both as ‘formal’
independence and ‘in mind’.” “Formal” independence was
associated with the proportion of independent directors on the
board, whereas independence “in mind” is identified with the
absence of potential conflict of interests. Initially, no mention is
made to whether that condition must hold ex ante or ex post.
One year later, the SSM retrieves and expands the concept of
independence. It is interesting to highlight that the SSM makes
a small twist in the terminology that it uses, and it starts to
speak of independence “of mind” rather than the independence
“in mind”. This tiny detail has major philosophical implications
since the former alludes to the behavior or the action of the
individual, and the latter to her character. The SSM defines
“to act with IoM” as “being able to make sound, objective and
independent decisions” (European Central Bank [ECB], 2017a,
p. 15) and it points out that IoM can be affected by conflict of
interests either actual, potential– i.e., reasonably foreseeable–, or
perceived–i.e., by the public.
In this context, the supervised entities are required to
adequately address any sort of conflict of interest and explain
to the competent authority how it is being prevented, mitigated
or managed. Interestingly, the SSM emphasizes that having a
conflict of interest does not necessarily imply that the person
cannot be considered suitable as an independent director as
long as the conflict does not impose a material risk and it is
adequately prevented, mitigated or managed according to the
written policies of the supervised entity. The SSM states that any
material conflict of interest should be assessed on a case-by-case
basis. Hence, it leaves a door open that invites one to look beyond
the status of the director.
Moreover, for the first time, a temporal view is introduced.
The SSM (European Central Bank [ECB], 2017a) highlights,
in a non-exhaustive manner four potential sources of conflicts
of interests – with respect to the corporation, including the
parent or subsidiaries – that are evaluated within different time
frames. Personal and financial causes are evaluated in the present,
whereas professional or political sources of conflicts are binding
within a 2-year lag. Furthermore, these sources apply not only
to the independent directors themselves, but also to the circle of
their close personal relations.
In a later report (European Central Bank [ECB], 2017b), the
SSM goes one step further and explicitly differentiates between
the notion of IoM and the principle of “being independent;” the
former is applicable to all members of the management body of
an institution whereas the latter is required for certain managers
in their supervisory function. Hence, the fact that a member
is considered as “being independent” does not mean that she
should automatically be deemed to be IoM as the member might
lack the required behavioral skills. The SSM (European Central
Bank [ECB], 2017b) clarifies that acting with IoM is actually a
pattern of behavior, revealed particularly during discussion and
decision-making, which enables the making of sound, objective
and independent decisions and judgments. “Being independent”
means that the person does not have any present or past
relationship or connection of any nature with the institution that
could influence the capacity of the member to act with IoM.
In that same report (European Central Bank [ECB], 2017b),
the SSM provides some criteria for assessing the IoM: it must
be evaluated according to two main conditions; behavioral skills
and the absence of conflicts of interests, which would handicap
the ability to act with genuine independence. At this point it can
be noticed how the SSM expands the context of independence
not only outward–toward the circumstances surrounding the
director–, but also inward, appealing to the virtues and the traits
of the character of the individual. In particular, it points out
that in order to have IoM a director should exhibit courage,
conviction and strength, having the capacity to ask questions and
demonstrate resistance to “groupthink.”
When it comes to independent directors, the SSM (European
Central Bank [ECB], 2017b) recalls that they should ensure
that the interests of stakeholders are taken into account in the
discussions and decision-making. The formal independence of
the directors is defined in negative terms, again by way of their
status, so that if the person “is not” anything that is specified by
SSM, she is deemed to be independent.
The mere fact of meeting in a positive sense one of these
requirements does not automatically qualify a person as not being
independent; in that case, the institution may demonstrate to the
competent authority the reasoning why the person is able to act
with IoM. Hence, the SSM affords vital importance to the context
and the evaluation of the particular circumstances in which the
director makes decision and acts beyond their status.
In one publication concerning good governance practices,
the SSM (European Central Bank [ECB], 2018) recalls the
importance of a contextual approach: “Banks need to have a
sufficient number of independent members on their boards.
These members play a key role in providing the necessary checks
and balances. However, formal independence is not enough in
itself: all board members need to be independent thinkers too. In
board discussions, the view of each board member must count.
This is a prerequisite not only for sound collective decision-
making, but also for fostering critical thinking and diversity,
which are essential qualities in counterbalancing the risk of
groupthink.”
Beyond reconciling the status and the context, the great
contribution of the SSM approach is to direct the debate
toward the essence of the individual who performs the role
of the independent director. The are two landmarks in this
process. First, when the SSM–albeit rather timidly and perhaps
unwittingly – raises the question of whether the directors should
act with independence “of mind” or “in mind,” and second, when
it expands inward, to the interior of the human being, the context
in which independence ought to be evaluated, pointing out some
virtues and character traits that are deemed desirable. This point
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directly opens up a gap for a third way which should unite the
condition of the character and the performance of the individual,
which must encompass both the status and the context.
THE SECOND GENERATION: A POSITIVE
APPROACH TO INDEPENDENCE
The first generation of independence is characterized by a person
not immersed in a conflict of interests, someone who does not
depend on another or who does not undergo interventions by
another. In sum, the independent member is defined as the one
that is not subject to another.
A definition of independence based on the status that only
takes into account the potentially harmful relationships between
the director and the corporation that may have taken place prior
to her entry onto a board is completely biased, describing only
a mere appearance of independence (Cf. Kaptein, 2018) and it
does not guarantee that the director will act with independence.
While the concept of status is valid as a condition, as a first
step or prudent safeguard against agency problems, it is not
valid to build a complete definition of independence around it
(Bainbridge, 2002).
Advancing a further step, by adding a priori conditions which
would seem to guarantee that the director is not disinterested – in
spite of not having a direct interest–, allows the contextualization
of the condition of independence and ensures that the decision-
making process is more effective (Rodrigues, 2008; Fairfax,
2010). However, the sort of independence in decision making
that should be incarnated by the independent director is not
guaranteed by this approach either.
We believe that a complete definition of independence should
be based on an integral vision of the person, encompassing
her virtues and character (Cf Kaptein and Wempe, 2002)
beside her formal qualifications. Neither things nor words are
“independent.” Only people can be and also not be. Avoiding
certain positions–status–, or meeting certain conditions–
context–, enables the set of potential candidates to be ranked,
which is a filter that shareholders must demand to shield their
interest in dealing with agency problems, but it does not imply
being independent as independence is an eminently practical
condition that manifests itself in a “way of acting,” in a “way of
being in the world,” and finally it reflects a “way of being.” Hence,
the second generation of independence must be described in
positive terms. We defined independence as a virtue guided by
practical wisdom, that implies autonomy and autarky and which
enables a person to act with integrity, fairness and truthfulness. In
the context of corporate governance, independence is associated
with an honest disposition to serve.
Independence demands practical wisdom (phronesis).
Aristotle defines phronesis in the Nicomachean Ethics
(henceforth NE: 1144a) as the virtue of choosing the suitable
means to the right end (Aristotle, 1991). But what are the
distinctive features of practical wisdom that make us associate
it with the ideal of independence in corporate governance? We
follow through Sison and Hühn (2018) to highlight the main
characteristic of practical wisdom for corporate governance.
First, practical wisdom is a moral virtue that implies doing the
right thing, the right way, for the right purpose, and in the right
circumstances (NE: 1126b). That is, performing the morally
right action correctly. It establishes habitual alignment between
proper perception, rational deliberation, choice and behavior
(NE: 1140a–b). Second, practical wisdom expresses normativity
beyond moral absolutes (NE 1110a) and general rules (NE
1137b). It implies accepting rules or codes, but only as general
guidelines, since they are never sufficient. Proper rule-following
invariably needs “prudential judgment” in its interpretation
and implementation since rules are not perfect, and they may
not foresee all the contingent circumstances. Practical wisdom
studies the norms applicable to a situation, the circumstances
or features of a problem, and decides how to proceed (Moberg,
2007). Third, practical wisdom exercises an integrative function
between dispositions to action and virtues (NE 1145a); without
it, no genuine virtue exists. Fourth, practical wisdom constitutes
a perceptual subjective standard of who the agent has become
as a result of previous action rather than an objective, external
rule of behavior available to any independent observer. Finally,
Aristotle lists practical wisdom among the character traits (ethos)
that a speaker must have to convince or persuade an audience
(Rhetoric: 1356a). Together with virtue (arête) and goodwill
(eunoia), practical wisdom allows speakers and leaders to form
correct opinions over concrete, contingent issues, enabling them
to express views justly and fairly, and ensuring sound advice
to listeners. They form the basis of a person’s credibility and
trustworthiness.
Independence must be synonymous with freedom, self-
government, self-control (Cf. Rua et al., 2017). An independent
person is thus the one who has the possibility to present and
sustain her opinions without interference or intervention from
others. This is well expressed by Langevoort (2001) when he
points out that independence should not consist only in the
lack of financial ties with the administration, it also includes
a clear expression of the will to provide a high degree of
rigor and skeptical objectivity regarding the evaluation of the
administration of the company, and its plans and proposals. Both
independence and autonomy are acquired, conquered capacities,
configured in the full deployment of wisdom and will. It is a
deployment that, by assuring that all the necessary elements
are possessed to carry out the action to the end, is carried
out firmly, in the sense of solidity, and morally right with
the help of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom guarantees a
proper alignment between this sort of IoM and the action of
the independent director. This task also requires autarky and
autonomy which could be understood as an intermediate step
toward independence.
From a theoretical perspective, autonomy reminds us of the
capacity to empower ourselves with laws of our own, that is,
that the person freely and voluntarily imposes upon herself a
criterion of action, a norm that guides her behavior. The key
to autonomy is in the action of giving to oneself, not so much
in the exercise or in the compliance of that norm that we have
given ourselves. The strength of that action rests in the fact that
the individual considers that this norm has a foundation with
which she agrees. The importance of the foundation also lies in
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its scope: the basis can be subjective, objective, intersubjective. As
an objective principle, the norm is self-imposed upon the will;
as a subjective principle, the norm is an exercise of one’s will;
as intersubjective, the key lies in the conviction that it will be
assumed by a good number of people who will appreciate in the
standard not just a mere particular occurrence, but a principle
that can be assumed by a community as a whole. In this sense,
independence is close to being a categorical imperative in which
what governs the action is not a particular interest, even if it is
legitimate, but in which the independent action is an end in itself.
The practical consequence of autonomy is autarky in a three-
fold sense. First, because autonomy puts us in a position to
exercise self-government. Second, autonomy also allows the
subject of the action, by virtue of the assumption of her
own criterion, to exercise a detachment from the outside.
Independence is like an inner conquest that does not renounce
to the exteriority, to the other, but, having examined it all, it
exercises the decision to separate oneself from that exteriority.
And, third, the most practical consequence is the exercise of
action itself: not only the examination of the conditions of the
action, but the exercise itself, its implementation, taking as a
horizon that the virtue of governance is, in reality, the governance
of virtue (Moore, 2012).
Independence leads to three fundamental characteristics that
chatacterize the actions of the independent director: integrity,
fairness and truthfulness.
Integrity is a kind of completeness that results from adequate
intellectual and technical formation and, at the same time,
denotes a moral significance, in the sense that whoever is integral
can never be someone outside of an ethical code and, therefore,
whose action always has consequences that affect other people.
Integrity derives from the social nature of independence.
Fairness is a consequence of the proportionality and balance
that reign in the decision making and in the execution of the
acts of the independent agent. Independent is never synonymous
with “fickle” and much less “arbitrary” (Diao et al., 2019; Trinh,
2019). A person who acts independently, is someone who weighs
the pros and cons; who examines carefully and in a balanced
way the factors that affect a certain issue; who deliberates
by showing prudence, without resorting to hasty actions that
can lead to or facilitate error; who with respect – and even
cordiality – is able to put themselves in the shoes of the other,
with empathy and delicacy.
In addition, independence is necessarily linked to truthfulness,
since only a precise knowledge of reality enables the formation of
a solid criterion of action. Of course, our rationality is limited and
our knowledge may not be optimal, but what is undeniable is that
we can do no less than endeavor to acquire the maximum possible
correct, rigorous, contrasted information.
A final nuance associated with the independent person who
reaches executive responsibility levels is the disposition to the
service. Governance implies service and that task requires
continuous learning, training, updating and commitment.
In this positive perspective, independence is simultaneously
a value and a virtue. It is a virtue insofar as it is a human
excellence and it produces positive feedback among other virtues
found in multiple operational trajectories. It is not possible to
be independent without being practically wise (phronimos), just,
temperate and courageous at the same time. Hence, it is not
possible to be a good independent director without trying to
render different stakeholders their due, being moderate in the
pursuit and use of resources, and persevering in the struggle
against obstacles. Independence as a virtue leads to flourishing
(NE: 1140a), the final end of human beings which is essentially
social and relational, not individualistic and utilitarian. From
an Aristotelian perspective, the goal of the independent director
should refer to how to make people capable of joint performance
so that the firm, as an economic unit, can contribute to
flourishing (eudaimonia) in political communities, the ultimate
end of human existence. The purpose of the firm displays the
characteristics of a common good: something that can only be
accomplished if all group members do so simultaneously (Sison
and Fontrodona, 2012), which undoubtedly resonates to the
principles of the BRT statement.
Independence is a virtue and as such it is voluntary (NE:
1114b). It is not a simple act of doing, but it is exercised because
of the goodness of the action itself, and in this sense, it is the
best clarification of an action not mediated by any conflict of
interest – which is the premise for formal independence. The
action of the independent person is not motivated by secondary
interests, but rather it is driven by the final end (eudaimonia).
Independence should overcome the tyranny or pressure exerted
by other interests which are not ordered means to lead the
corporation toward the common good of all its members.
Independence becomes a value in itself because it turns the
person who possesses it into someone “special,” who is supposed
to have a strong moral character as well as aptitude, skill,
efficiency, and display exemplarity and leadership (Neubert et al.,
2009). Value and virtue can only be understood if they are
incarnated in the practical life of a specific individual, Therefore,
there is no gap between being independent and acting with
independence (Sen, 2009: 158), because we can only identify
the genuine independent person by her actions; without action,
there is no independence because there is no practice. Thus,
independence as a way of being – and not only as a way of acting –
is intimately related to integrity.
The second generation of independence is radically linked
to an ethical and psychological perspective. The “ethos” is not
only a certain type of character but above all, a way of being
that directs the way of acting (Chun, 2005). Perhaps it is to this
dimension that the European Central Bank [ECB] (2016) refers
when it mentions the aspiration to achieve an “independence in
mind” that goes beyond mere formality, which finds its meaning
more than in normative codes, but in concrete behaviors of
specific people.
For the second generation, we have defined independence
as a virtue guided by practical wisdom, that implies autonomy
and autarky and which enables a person to act with integrity,
fairness and truthfulness. In the context of corporate governance,
independence is associated with an honest disposition to service.
In the end, independence is an ideal that is only incarnated in
people, and these are the clearest expressions of fragility. There
is no independence without independent directors and these are
neither automatons nor infallible, but they have the conditions
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and the position to lead the change in business models that the
BRT statement demands.
CONCLUSION
Corporate Social Responsibility has been correlated with
BI and, in recent decades, the value and weight of BI
has become imperative in corporate governance. However,
CSR has not developed at the same pace. One explanation
is the lack of a consistent definition that identifies the
characteristics of independent directors. Traditionally, there
have been two different approaches to identify a director
as being independent: the status-based approach – used by
SOX and Nasdaq–, which describes an ex ante materiality,
and the contextual approach – followed by the ECB – which
distinguishes between formal independence and IoM. Both
approaches are part of a first generation of definitions that
are characterized by a negative conception of independence,
centered on its supervisory function, that turns out to be
partial. They do not guarantee that a director that qualifies
as independent actually behaves with the independence that
her position demands. We believe that a complete definition
of independence should be based on an integral vision of
the person, encompassing her virtues and character, besides
her formal status and the contextual circumstances, because
there is no independence without independent people. This
paper provides a second-generation definition of independence
based on a positive approximation to the concept. We defined
independence as a virtue guided by practical wisdom, that
implies autonomy and autarky and which enables a person to
act with integrity, fairness and truthfulness. In the context of
corporate governance, independence is associated with an honest
disposition to serve.
We believe that if corporations are able to sustain their BI
with independent members inspired by this second generation of
independence, they will be able to implement effective changes in
their business models to align their corporate and social purpose
with the demands of the BRT statement.
Following the Aristotelian social tradition, corporate
governance refers to how the corporation, as an economic
unit, could contribute to flourishing (eudaimonia) in political
communities, the ultimate end of human existence. The purpose
of the firm displays the characteristics of a common good:
something that can only be accomplished if all group members
do so simultaneously (Sison and Fontrodona, 2012). We believe
that this account of the purpose of the corporation is in line
with the principles set by the BRT statement, and it stresses the
political dimension of business. Business should not be conceived
independently of society, and thus corporate directors must
display an honest disposition to serve to all the stakeholders on
whom the corporate activity impacts.
Independence requires practical wisdom. Phronesis guarantees
that independent directors look for goods of effectiveness –
i.e., external standards of success such as profits, market share,
share price – in so far as they enable goods of excellence –
i.e., the virtues people develop in support of the firm which
are conducive to flourishing (Sison and Hühn, 2018). Hence, it
debunks Friedman (1970)’s thesis that stresses the supremacy of
shareholders’ interests.
Understanding independence as a virtue implies that it is
voluntary, a good in itself, perfective of the individual that acts
with independence. The actions of the independent director
are not mediated by any conflict of interest – the goal of
formal independence–, but rather they are motivated by the
final end (eudaimonia). Accordingly, the second-generation of
independence will be more effective than its first-generation
counterpart as an antidote to corporate scandals, which has been
the main concern of the regulatory efforts that developed the
figure of the independent director.
Finally, independence is associated with a set of virtues that
reinforce each other in a positive feedback effect. An agent
may not be independent without being prudent, courageous or
a person of integrity and justice. Hence, a good independent
director will strive to render the various stakeholders their due,
being moderate in the pursuit and use of resources, and look for
the wellbeing of the communities linked to the corporate activity
and society as a whole.
Future research should focus on designing specific selection
criteria and evaluation methods for second-generation
independent directors, regulatory reforms and policies to
translate this second generation of independence onto boards,
and strategies to promote the development of a corporate culture
that fosters a second generation of independence.
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